MERGERS IN DURABLE-GOODS INDUSTRIES: A RE-EXAMINATION OF MARKET POWER AND WELFARE EFFECTS by Ari Gerstle & Michael Waldman
American Law & Economics
Association Annual Meetings
Year 2004 Paper 31
MERGERS IN DURABLE-GOODS
INDUSTRIES: A RE-EXAMINATION
OF MARKET POWER AND
WELFARE EFFECTS
Ari D. Gerstle Michael Waldmany
U.S. Dept. of Justice - Antitrust Division
yJohnson Graduate School of Management
This working paper site is hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press (bepress) and may not be
commercially reproduced without the publisher's permission.
http://law.bepress.com/alea/14th/art31
Copyright c 
2004 by the authors.MERGERS IN DURABLE-GOODS INDUSTRIES: 
A RE-EXAMINATION OF MARKET POWER AND WELFARE EFFECTS
by 
Ari D. Gerstle
U.S. Department of Justice
600 E. St., NW
Washington, DC 20530
(202) 307-0678,  ari.gerstle@usdoj.gov
and 
Michael Waldman
Johnson Graduate School of Management
Cornell University
Sage Hall
Ithaca, NY  14853 
(607) 255-8631, mw46@cornell.edu
March 2004
* We would like to thank George Hay, Mario Marazzi, and Robert T. Masson for helpful comments.  The 
views expressed herein are the authors’ own and are not purported to reflect those of the U.S. Dept. of 
Justice.
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic PressABSTRACT
In a classic paper on the welfare effects of mergers in durable-goods industries, Carlton and 
Gertner (1989) argued that the presence of a competitively supplied stock of used units substantially 
reduces the social-welfare losses associated with mergers that increase market power.  Their analysis 
employed an approach to modeling durable-goods markets that was popularized by Swan in the early 
1970s in which new and used “service units” are perfect substitutes in consumption.  We employ a 
modeling approach similar to those employed in recent contributions by Waldman (1996) and Hendel 
and Lizzeri (1999) which, more realistically, does not make this perfect substitutability assumption.  Our 
analysis confirms the result that a competitively supplied stock of used units does typically reduce the 
welfare loss associated with a durable-goods merger.  However, we also show that this reduction is much 
smaller than found in Carlton and Gertner’s analysis.  The implication is that the antitrust authorities 
should be more concerned about mergers in durable-goods industries than the existing literature suggests. 
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Most of the the theoretical literature concerning the effects of mergers focuses on nondurable-
goods industries, but in the real world many of the mergers of concern to regulatory authorities are in 
durable-goods industries.1  This paper contributes to a small but important literature concerning the 
effects of mergers in durable-goods industries.  In particular, we explore the implications of adopting a 
new and more realistic approach to modeling durable-goods markets that has been explored by various 
authors over the last ten years.  We show that employing this new approach yields social-welfare losses 
associated with durable-goods mergers that are larger than losses found in the previous literature on this 
topic, which suggests the antitrust authorities should be more concerned about mergers in durable-goods 
industries than a reading of the previous literature on this topic might indicate.
The classic paper on the welfare effects of mergers in durable-goods markets is Carlton and 
Gertner (1989).  Their focus is on how an existing stock of used units serves to limit the welfare loss 
associated with a merger that increases market power.  In particular, they consider a durable-goods 
market initially characterized by perfect competition in which a merger results in a monopoly outcome.  
They also assume that after the merger the monopolist rents rather than sells its ouput which eliminates 
time inconsistency as an issue.  Their main result is that, if durable units depreciate slowly, then the stock 
of used units that exist at the time of the merger both stops the post-merger monopolist from significantly 
raising the price immediately after the merger and limits the deadweight loss due to monopoly pricing in 
the first few periods that follow the merger.  In turn, they conclude that, if depreciation is slow and 
competitive entry is anticipated within a few periods, then the expected aggregate social-welfare loss due 
to the merger may be so small as to not warrant the attention of the antitrust authorities.
Carlton and Gertner’s analysis employs the approach to modeling durable-goods markets 
popularized by Peter Swan in the early 1970s (see Swan (1970,1971) and Sieper and Swan (1973)).2  In 
1 The economic analysis of mergers encompasses a vast and diverse literature spanning oligopoly theory, game 
theory, and other branches of industrial organization.  Texts such as Tirole (1988), Carlton and Perloff (1999), and 
Vives (2000) all detail much of the foundations of modern merger analysis.  Perhaps the most concise summary of 
widely accepted lessons from this literature is embodied in the joint DOJ/FTC Horizontal Merger Guidelines (1997).  
The guidelines are largely focused on the analysis of non-durable good industries.  In fact, mention of durable goods 
is limited to two sentences related to the evaluation of the timeliness of post-merger competitive entry.
2 Swan traces this approach to modeling durable-goods markets back to Wicksell (1934).  Also, see Schmalensee 
(1979) for a survey of the literature that explores this approach to modeling durable-goods markets and Waldman 
(2003) for a survey that discusses this literature and more recent contributions to durable-goods theory.
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this approach, each unit of the durable good can be thought of as a bundle of service units that decay over 
time, where a service unit derived from a used unit of output is a perfect substitute for one derived from a 
new unit and consumer preferences are modeled as demand for service units.  Further, at any point in 
time, one can think of the flow demand for service units first being satisfied by the existing stock of used 
units, and new durable units then satisfying the residual demand.  When thought of in this way, the logic 
for the Carlton and Gertner result is clear.  If the speed of decay of durable units is slow, then the residual 
demand the monopolist faces in the first few periods following the merger will be small which, in turn, 
limits potential social welfare losses in those first few periods.  
In recent papers, Waldman (1996) and Hendel and Lizzeri (1999) have criticized Swan’s 
approach and reanalayzed some fundamental issues concerning durable goods in models that employ a 
distinctly different approach.  The criticism is straightforward.  In a Swan-type model, a consumer can 
combine service units derived from a number of used units to create a perfect substitute for a new unit.  
Although this may be a reasonable assumption for some products, for most durable products such as 
televisions, refrigerators, and automobiles in which only one physical unit is used at a given time, it is not 
a realistic assumption.  In their papers, Waldman and Hendel and Lizzeri consider models that do not 
satisfy this assumption but rather each individual consumes a single unit of the product or no unit at all 
and used-unit depreciation is modeled as a reduction in the unit’s quality.3  They show that employing 
this alternative approach overturns some basic findings in the durable-goods literature.  For example, in 
contrast to Swan’s conclusions, they find that even in the absence of commitment problems a durable-
goods monopolist does not typically choose the socially optimal level of durability.4
In this paper we consider the welfare effects of durable-goods mergers employing the basic 
approach to durable-goods modeling explored in Waldman (1996) and Hendel and Lizzeri (1999).  In 
addition to consumers not being able to combine used units to create a perfect substitute for a new unit 
and depreciation being modeled as a reduction in the unit’s quality, the other main assumptions are that 
3 A related approach is explored in Fudenberg and Tirole (1998) who assume no used-unit depreciation but rather 
that newer vintages are of higher quality.  
4 As discussed in detail in Waldman (1996), this alternative approach to modeling durable goods is closely related to 
the classic analyses of Mussa and Rosen (1978) and Maskin and Riley (1984) of a monopolist who sells a product 
line of different qualities to consumers who vary in their valuations of quality (see also Moorthy and Png (1992)).  
The basic idea is that, in this approach to modeling durable goods, one can think of the monopolist as producing a 
product line over time in which new units are the high-quality units while the different vintages of used units are the 
lower qualities in the product line.
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consumers are differentiated with respect to valuation for quality, new units are sold rather than rented, 
and there is a frictionless secondhand market on which used units trade.  Following Carlton and Gertner, 
our analysis focuses on an industry that is initially competitive and then a merger leads to a monopoly 
outcome.  Further, the monopoly is assumed to persist for a finite number of periods after which entry 
causes the market to revert back to a competitive outcome.  The impact of this short-lived monopoly is 
then analyzed and, in particular, compared with the Carlton and Gertner findings.
Our analysis of this model yields three main results.  First, price increases following the merger 
are both dramatic and immediate – in particular, we find price changes immediately following the merger 
that range between 26% and 245% of the competitive price level.  Second, if  entry occurs a small 
number of periods after the merger, then consistent with the Carlton and Gertner analysis we find that the
present discounted value of welfare losses is smaller than in the analogous nondurable-good case.  
However, although this present discounted value is smaller than in the analogous nondurable-good case, 
for similar parameter values it is substantially larger than in Carlton and Gertner’s analysis.  Third, 
increasing the number of periods till entry occurs not only increases the absolute welfare loss due to the 
merger, but also moves the welfare loss in the durable-goods case closer (in percentage terms) to the 
welfare loss in the analogous nondurable-goods case.  In fact, if the number of periods is sufficiently 
high, the welfare loss in the durable-goods case can even exceed the loss in the analogous nondurable-
goods case.   In summary, we confirm Carlton and Gertner’s basic argument that in durable-goods 
industries the presence of a competitively supplied stock of used units will typically reduce the social-
welfare loss associated with a merger that increases market power.  However, we find the magnitude of 
this reduction to be much smaller than in Carlton and Gertner’s analysis.  
The obvious question is, what causes the differences between our analysis and Carlton and 
Gertner’s, and the answer is the difference in assumptions discussed above concerning the ability of 
consumers to combine used units to create a perfect substitute for a new unit.  Consider what happens 
after a merger in Carlton and Gertner’s analysis.  Because of the frictionless secondhand market that 
reallocates service units to those consumers with the highest valuations, any consumer with a high 
valuation for the product consumes a new unit or used units that in aggregate are equivalent to a new 
unit, so with respect to high valuation consumers there is no reduction in social welfare.  The aggregate 
reduction in social welfare is due solely to the existence of consumers who should consume the product 
but do not, where these are consumers whose valuations for the product are close to the “marginal” 
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valuation in the competitive case, i.e., individuals for whom consuming the product yields a small social 
surplus.  Now suppose depreciation is slow.  Then immediately after the merger the aggregate stock of 
service units embodied in new and used units will be close to the pre-merger level and the number of 
consumers who “should” but do not consume the good will be small.  The small number of affected 
consumers combined with the fact that the loss in social welfare per affected consumer is small means 
the aggregate welfare loss must be small as well.
Now consider our analysis.  In any period in our model each individual consumes a single unit or 
no units at all, where due to the frictionless secondhand market there is a perfect positive correlation 
between an individual’s valuation for the product and the quality of the product consumed.  Now suppose 
there is a merger and after the merger the resulting monopolist reduces the output of new units below the 
competitive level.  In contrast to what was true in Carlton and Gertner’s analysis, it is not just the 
consumers for whom consuming the product yields a small social surplus who are affected.  Rather, many 
individuals are affected some of whom have valuations far above the valuation of the marginal consumer 
in the competitive case.  The reason is that, because used units cannot be combined to form a perfect 
substitute for a new unit, the reduction in the supply of high-quality units necessarily means that some 
high valuation individuals will consume lower quality units than previously.  The result is that, as the 
monopolist reduces output, numerous individuals scattered throughout the valuation distribution wind up 
consuming a good of lower quality than was true in the competitive case.  Hence, the loss in social 
welfare is larger here because more individuals are affected, some of the affected individuals have 
valuations for the product that far exceed that of the marginal consumer in the competitive case, and 
reducing the quality consumed of a high-valuation consumer significantly reduces surplus.
So the basic argument here is that a Swan-type setting is not only characterized by the unrealistic 
assumption that used units can be combined to form a perfect substitute for a new unit, but in addition 
this unrealistic assumption translates into a similarly unrealistic picture of the social-welfare 
consequences of a merger that significantly increases market power.  Hypothetically, suppose a series of 
mergers among automobile manufacturers moved the industry from a competitive situation to one 
characterized by a monopolist.  Further, suppose that in the period after this series of mergers this 
monopolist chose an output level equal to half the competitive output.  Under the Swan assumptions, in 
the period after the mergers there is little or no social-welfare loss due to the consumption decisions of 
individuals who would have purchased new units under competition but do not under monopoly.  The 
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reason is that most or all of these individuals combine the services of multiple used cars so that services 
consumed is the same as if they had purchased new cars.  But clearly this is not a correct description of 
what would happen if such mergers actually occurred.  From a real-world perspective and consistent with 
our analysis, social welfare would fall due to the consumption decisions of these individuals because the 
cars they would consume would be of lower quality than would be the case if the mergers had never 
occurred.
Besides Carlton and Gertner’s analysis, there are two other papers that consider the effects of 
durable-goods mergers.  As do Carlton and Gertner, Froeb (1989) considers a setting characterized by 
Swan-type durability and the effects of a merger that changes a competitive situation to one characterized 
by a monopolist.  He assumes the monopolist sells rather than rents, but avoids time inconsistency by 
assuming that in its first period of operation the monopolist commits to a sequence of outputs for all 
future periods.  Rather than focusing on the social-welfare losses due to such a merger, Froeb’s focus is 
on the speed with which the monopolist raises price by at least five percent above the competitive level 
and on the monopoly steady-state price level.  His main finding is that faster depreciation results in the 
monopolist raising price more quickly and a higher monopoly steady-state price.
More recently Reitman (2001) challenges the robustness of Carlton and Gertner’s conclusions by 
having the monopolist sell rather than rent its output as does Froeb (1989), and allowing consumers to 
extend the lifetime of a unit by paying repair costs that are increasing in the age of the unit.  As was true 
for the other papers, he employs the Swan durability assumptions and focuses on a merger that moves a 
competitive setting to a monopoly outcome.  Also, he avoids time inconsistency by assuming the 
monopolist irreversibly chooses a capacity level and sells that amount every period.  Using numerical 
examples, he shows that the initial price increase following the merger is on the order of one-third of the 
final price increase and final prices are one to one and one-half times the competitive price level.  The 
monopolist is able to exercise market power immediately because consumers correctly anticipate even 
higher prices in the future (this issue does not arise in Carlton and Gertner’s analysis because of their 
assumption the monopolist rents its output) and rationally chooses to purchase new units immediately 
and consume them for more periods.5  As with Froeb (1989), the focus here is on the speed of price 
changes and eventual steady-state price levels rather than on the social-welfare losses due to the merger.
5 As in our paper, Reitman models rational consumers with the ability to behave strategically in terms of their 
scrappage and maintenance decisions, and he also assumes the monopolist can commit to an output sequence 
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As a final introductory point, consider the public-policy implications of our analysis.  The 
analysis in this paper in a sense confirms but in another sense contradicts the Carlton and Gertner 
conclusions.  Suppose depreciation is slow and merger now is likely to lead to entry relatively quickly.  
Then we agree with Carlton and Gertner that the antitrust authorities should be less concerned about a 
durable-goods merger that increases market power than they should be for an analogous nondurable-
goods merger.  However, we depart from Carlton and Gertner in two ways.  First, because the social-
welfare loss due to such a merger is reduced much less by the fact the product is durable in our analysis 
than theirs, our belief is that the scrutiny of the antitrust authorities should be relatively similar across the 
two cases (our interpretation of Carlton and Gertner is that they feel the antitrust authorities should be 
much less vigilant in the durable-goods case).  Second, because in our analysis the reduction in the 
social-welfare loss due to durability depends strongly on the speed of future entry, we would emphasize 
more than Carlton and Gertner do the likely speed of future entry as an important determinant of whether 
or not durable-goods mergers should be allowed.
II. MODEL AND PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS
In this section we first present our durable-goods model.  We then provide some preliminary 
results that focus on consumption choices, prices, and scrappage decisions.  In the last subsection we 
then use these preliminary results to characterize competitive steady-state behavior.  In the following 
section we consider the monopoly steady state and the transition dynamics associated with a merger that 
moves the market from competition to monopoly.
A) The Model
We consider an infinite-period model in which new units are initially produced by a perfectly 
competitive industry (or alternatively there is initially a duopoly and Bertrand price competition).  At 
some date t￿ a merger or series of mergers occurs that collapses this competitive situation to a single 
monopoly producer, and then at some later date t￿￿ entry occurs and the industry returns to a competitive 
(although different than our approach, his commitment is in terms of a one-time choice of capacity).  As a 
consequence, there is a similarity in results in that in both papers post-merger price increases are immediate and 
substantial.  In contrast, however, although Reitman does not analyze welfare losses of the merger, we suspect that 
on this dimension the results would be quite different.  That is, because Reitman employs a Swan-type specification, 
in his model welfare losses are confined to consumers who receive little surplus from consuming the durable product 
and so these losses should be much smaller than what we find.
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situation.  Following Carlton and Gertner we assume that both the initial merger to monopoly and the 
subsequent entry are unanticipated by producers and consumers (we also discuss how results would 
change if the subsequent entry were anticipated rather than unanticipated).  Our focus will be on the 
speed with which price increases after the merger and the social-welfare losses due to the monopolist’s 
output reductions.
Each manufacturer has a constant marginal cost of production equal to c and no fixed costs of 
production.  A new unit produced by any manufacturer is of quality Q
N, while a used unit of age s is of 
quality ￿
sQ
N, 0<￿<1, i.e., used-unit quality is negatively related to the age of the unit.  Further, we also 
assume that a used unit can be scrapped at a fixed value z that is independent of the unit’s age.  Note that 
in addition to consumers being able to purchase new units from manufacturers, there is a frictionless 
secondhand market on which consumers buy and sell used units.  Further, in any period the prices of the 
various vintages of used units simply equate supply and demand.
On the demand side, we assume a continuum of consumers of total mass N who are 
heterogeneous in terms of their valuations for quality.  In particular, each consumer i has a valuation for 
quality vi, where the valuations for quality in the population are distributed uniformly over the interval 
[0,1].  We thus have that individual i derives a gross benefit in period t equal to vi￿
sQ
N from consuming a 
unit of age s, where it is assumed that in each period an individual in this world consumes either zero 
physical units or one physical unit of output (a new unit is throught of as being of age zero).
We also assume that consumers face a cost of maintenance that is an increasing function of the 
age of the unit.  Specifically, the cost of maintaining a unit of age s, denoted m(s), is given by 
m(s)=b0+b1s.  Note that the linear form we assume is consistent with studies of the agricultural 4-wheel 
drive tractor industry which serves as the basis for the numerical analysis we conduct in Section IV.  Let 
p(s,t) be the market price of a unit of age s in period t.  If consumer i does not own a used unit at the 
beginning of period t, then the consumer’s net benefit in period t for consuming a unit of age s is given 
by vi￿
sQ
N-p(s,t)-m(s).  If the consumer does own a used unit at the beginning of the period, then the sale 
price of the unit is added to this expression for net utility.  Finally, the firm and all consumers have a 
discount factor ￿, 0<￿￿1.
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B)  Preliminary Results
 This subsection provides some preliminary results concerning consumption choices, prices, and 
scrappage decisions.  Let S(t) denote the age of the oldest unit that is consumed in period t.  Given the 
net benefit expression above for an individual consuming a unit of age s in period t, we have that 
consumer i in period t prefers a unit of age s to a unit of age s￿ if equation (1) is satisfied.





That is, consumer i prefers a unit of age s to a unit of age s￿ in period t when the consumer’s net benefit 
from consuming the age-s unit plus the discounted value of its t+1 price is greater than the consumer’s 
net benefit from consuming an age-s￿ unit plus the discounted value of its t+1 price.  Note that this 
equation could have been written to include the sale price of any unit owned by the consumer at the 
beginning of the period, but this term would appear on both sides of the inequality and so would cancel 
out.
By isolating vi in equation (1) we can derive necessary and sufficient conditions for individual i 
to consume a unit of age s in period t.  These are given by equations (2), (3), and (4).
(2)             vi<[p(s￿,t)-￿p(s￿+1,t+1)+m(s￿)-p(s,t)+￿p(s+1,t+1)-m(s)]/￿
s￿(1-￿
s-s￿)Q
N for all s￿, 0￿s￿<s
(3)             vi>[p(s,t)-￿p(s+1,t+1)+m(s)-p(s￿,t)+￿p(s￿+1,t+1)-m(s￿)]/￿
s(1-￿
s￿-s)Q
N for all s￿, s<s￿￿St
(4)                                                     vi>[p(s,t)-￿p(s+1,t+1)-m(s)]/￿
sQ
N
Equation (2) ensures that the consumer prefers a unit of age s to all newer units, (3) ensures that a unit of 
age s is preferred to all older units, while (4) ensures that the consumer prefers a unit of age s to not 
consuming any unit at all.
We now turn to scrappage decisions, prices, and the allocation of new and used units among 
consumers.  There are two things that are straightforward.  First, given the positive scrap value, 
monotonically decreasing quality (utility from consumption), and the maintenance cost which is a linear 
increasing function of a unit’s age, units are not consumed indefinitely but are rather scrapped at some 
finite age.  Second, in any period there is a perfect negative correlation between a consumer’s value for vi
and the age of the unit the individual consumes (for this statement interpret not consuming a unit as 
consuming a unit that is infinitely old).  This follows from our assumption of a frictionless secondhand 
market and the fact that higher vi consumers are willing to pay more for the incremental quality 
associated with consuming a newer unit.
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We now turn to how prices are determined.  Remember that S(t) denotes the age of the oldest 
unit consumed in period t.  Also, let v(s,t) be the valuation of the lowest-valuation individual who 
consumes a unit of age s in period t.  Consider some period t.  In considering consumption decisions 
regarding goods of age S(t) there are two cases.  The first is that some units of age S(t) are scrapped 
while others are consumed.  Given that units of age S(t) are scrapped, we have that p(S(t),t)=z.  We also 
know that the price is equal to the net benefit the marginal consumer of the unit derives from its 
consumption plus the discounted value of the market price of the unit in the following period, i.e., 
p(S(t),t)=v(S(t),t)￿
S(t)Q
N-m(S(t))+￿p(S(t)+1,t+1).  The logic here is that, if the price were above this sum 
the marginal consumer would be unwilling to buy a unit of age S(t), while if it were below then a lower 
valuation consumer would want to purchase a unit of age S(t).    
Now consider a unit of age S(t)-1.  The price of this unit equals the sum of the price of a unit of 
age S(t), the savings in maintenance costs from consuming a unit of age S(t)-1 rather than a unit of age 
S(t), the amount the marginal consumer of an age-S(t)-1 unit places on the incremental quality associated 




N+￿(p(S(t),t+1)-p(S(t)+1,t+1).  In turn, we can generalize this 
result to derive the price for any unit of age less than S(t).  This is given in equation (5).
(5)                p(s,t)=p(s+1,t)+b1+v(s,t)(￿
s-￿
s+1)Q
N+￿(p(s+1,t+1)-p(s+2,t+1)) for all t and s<S(t)
Note that this price function is similar to how prices are determined in the static product line pricing 
literature such as Mussa and Rosen (1978) with the addition of the discounted difference in the following 
period’s market prices of the units (see footnote 4).
The other case is that no used units of age S(t) are scrapped rather than consumed.  First, using 
the same logic as in the first case, we know that in this case the price of a unit of age S(t) must equal the 
net benefit the marginal consumer of the unit derives from its consumption plus the discounted value of 
the market price of the unit in the following period.  Second, in contrast to the first case, since no units 
are scrapped this price must be greater than or equal to the scrap price rather than necessarily being equal 
to the scrap price.  Third, as in the first case, the price of a unit whose age is strictly less than S(t) is 
given by equation (5).
The next result concerns the relationship between the age of the oldest unit consumed in a 
period, S(t), and the lowest valuation individual who consumes a unit in the period, v(S(t),t).  These two 
variables are linked together through the basic equilibrium condition that supply must equal demand.  Let 
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￿t, 0<￿t￿1, be the proportion of age-S(t) units that are consumed rather than scrapped in period t and yt be 
aggregate industry output in period t.  Then the following condition must hold.




j  yt+1-j 
The left hand side of equation (6) is the total number of consumers demanding a unit, while the right 
hand side is the total supply of units on the market given that (1-￿t) of the age-S(t) units are scrapped.6
Given that all units of age strictly less than S(t) are consumed in period t and there is a positive 
correlation between the quality of a unit and the valuation of the individual who consumes the unit, we 
can also derive a similar condition for each v(s,t), s<S(t).  This is given in equation (7).
(7)                                                      (1-v(s,t))N=￿ =
s
j 1  yt+1-j 
The left-hand side is the total number of consumers whose valuation for quality exceeds v(s,t), while the 
right-hand side is the total supply of units age-s or newer.
We can use the above results to derive a condition that determines whether in some period t the








j  yt+1-j]/N, i.e., vt
+ is 
the lowest valuation individual who would consume a unit in period t if in period t all units of age S(t) 
were consumed rather than scrapped.  Period t will be consistent with case 1 if equation (8) is satisfied, 




while it will be consistent with case 2 if equation (9) is satisfied,




That is, some units of age S(t) will be scrapped if in the absence of scrappage the price for such a unit 
would be strictly less than the scrap price, while none of these units will be scrapped if in the absence of 
scrappage the price for such a unit would be greater than or equal to the scrap price.  Similarly, given (5), 
(6), and (7), S(t) and ￿t are characterized by equation (10).
(10)                                                            p(S(t),t)=￿z if ￿t<(=)1
Note, if ￿t=1 and p(S(t),t)>z, then S(t) is the highest value consistent with p(S(t),t)>z.
6 For this statement, an individual who consumes the same unit he or she owned at the beginning of a period is 
thought of as selling the unit to him or herself.
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C)  Competitive Steady State
A steady state in this model is characterized by a constant output of new units, y, a constant 
highest age of used units that are consumed, S, a constant proportion of these used units that are 
consumed, ￿, a vector of constant prices, (p0,…pS), for various vintages consumed in a period, and a 
vector of constant valuations, (v0,…vS), that captures the lowest valuation consumer of each vintage 
consumed.  Further, the price vector must satisfy equation (5) while equations (6) and (7) determine the 
vector of minimum valuations as a function of y, S, and ￿.  In the competitive case, the model is closed by 
the fact that the zero-profit condition associated with competition means that the new-unit price, p0, must 
equal the marginal or average total cost of production, c.
To be more precise, the way this works in the competitive case is as follows.  Let p0=c and 
choose an arbitrary (for the moment) value for y.  For any (S,￿) pair, equations (6) and (7) determine the 
vector (v0,…vS), while this vector in combination with equation (5) and the fact that the price vector is 
constant determines the price vector (p0,…pS).  The (S,￿) pair is then the unique pair that results in pS=z 
or, if no such pair exists, then ￿=1 and S is the highest value such that pS>z.  Finally, given this, the 
steady-state value for y is the unique value that results in pS equalling the sum of the net value that the 
marginal consumer of an age-S unit places on the unit plus the discounted value of an age-S+1 unit’s 
market price.
III. MONOPOLY STEADY STATE AND TRANSITION DYNAMICS
In this section we analyze both the monopoly steady-state solution to the model and the transition 
dynamics associated with a merger that transforms a compeititive steady state to a monopoly outcome.  
Before presenting these two analyses, however, we begin the section by discussing our assumption 
concerning monopoly and commitment.
A) Durable-Goods Monopoly and Commitment
As first discussed by Coase (1972) and later formalized by Bulow (1982), in the absence of the 
ability to commit to future actions, a durable-goods monopolist faces a time-inconsistency problem that 
lowers its own profitability.  The basic logic is easily seen by considering Bulow’s two-period analysis of 
a monopoly seller.  In that analysis the monopolist’s second-period output choice affects the second-
period value of units sold as new in the first period, which means the price for new units in the first 
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period depends on consumer expectations concerning this second-period choice.  The time-inconsistency 
problem is that, if the monopolist cannot commit in the first period to this second-period choice, then in 
the second period it ignores the effect of its output choice on the second-period value of these used units 
and chooses an output level above what it would choose if it could commit.  In turn, the anticipation of 
this behavior by consumers in the first period lowers both the first-period price and overall monopoly 
profitability.  Bulow also shows that the problem can be avoided if the monopolist rents rather than sells 
its output.
Following Coase and Bulow’s contributions, most of the literature on durable-goods monopoly 
assumes commitment about future prices and quantities is not possible and thus focuses on the time-
inconsistency problem concerning output choice.7  However, consistent with Butz (1990) who shows that 
contractual provisions such as best-price provisions or most-favored-customer clauses can ameliorate the 
problem, we feel that in most real-world settings commitment or at least partial commitment concerning 
output is possible and thus that the time-inconsistency problem concerning output choice is less central 
than the literature suggests.  Think, for example, of a firm that sells commemorative coins.  It sells a good 
that is basically perfectly durable, and it can sell the good today or at any later date.  On the surface this 
seems to be exactly the type of firm that should be subject to time inconsistency.  In reality, however, 
time inconsistency is not typically a significant problem in such cases because firms commit to upper 
bounds on future quantities through what is called a limited edition.  Another way to put this is that 
Coase’s insights are important not because durable-goods sellers frequently fall victim to the time-
inconsistency problem he identified, but rather because his insights help us understand various 
contractual provisions that allow firms to mostly avoid the problem. 
A further justification for allowing a post-merger durable-goods monopolist to avoid the time-
inconsistency problem concerning output choice was put forth by Froeb (1989).  His basic point is that, 
since the main goal of considering durable-goods mergers is the evaluation of the potential 
anticompetitive harm from such a merger, it makes most sense to consider a case where time 
inconsistency is absent or at least of limited importance.  In other words, as first pointed out by Coase, a 
durable-goods monopolist that falls victim to time inconsistency concerning output choice behaves in a 
competitive or close to competitive fashion.  Hence, it is only when the monopolist can avoid time 
7 See, for example, Stokey (1981), Gul, Sonnenschein and Wilson (1986), and Ausubel and Deneckere (1989).
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inconsistency that the merger is even potentially an antitrust concern, so that is the case one should focus 
on in evaluating the potential social harm of a durable-goods merger.
Consistent with the above discussion and also with the previous papers discussed in the 
Introduction that focus on durable-goods mergers, we assume that after the merger the monopolist is able 
to solve its commitment problem concerning output choice and thus avoid the time-inconsistency issue.  
There are two main ways that the literature has identified for how a durable-goods monopolist can avoid 
the time - inconsistency problem concerning output choice.  The first way is that, as discussed above, the 
firm can sell its output and either directly or indirectly contractually commit to future output choices, 
while the second is that, as first discussed by Coase and Bulow, the firm can rent as opposed to sell its 
output.8  In the analysis that follows we take the former approach and assume that immediately after the 
merger the post-merger monopolist commits to a sequence of future production levels.
There are three reasons for why we assume that the monopolist avoids time inconsistency by 
selling its output and committing through contracting rather than renting its output.  The first is that this 
approach is analytically simpler.  When the firm sells its output and avoids time inconsistency through 
contracting, the only choice is a new-unit production level for each period.  In contrast, in the rental case 
the firm chooses a production level for each period plus how many used units of each vintage to retire in 
each period, where the return to retiring used units before the market price exceeds the scrap price is that 
this raises the price at which new units can be rented.9  As indicated, introducing this issue significantly 
complicates the analysis. 
The second reason we assume selling and commitment rather than renting concerns moral 
hazard.  That is, although we do not explicitly model the problem, if consumers can affect the quality of 
used units through their maintenance decisions then selling and commitment may be preferred over 
renting because of moral hazard.  The idea is that a consumer who rents will underinvest in maintenance 
because the consumer anticipates returning the unit to the manufacturer at the end of the rental period 
8 In addition to contracting and renting, Bulow (1986) shows that a durable-goods monopolist may reduce its time-
inconsistency problem by reducing the durability of its output, Ausubel and Deneckere (1989) show that reputation 
formation is a way for a firm to avoid the problem, while Karp and Perloff (1996) and Kutsoati and Zabojnik (2001) 
argue that a firm can sometimes reduce the problem by initially using an inferior high-cost technology.
9 See Waldman (1997) for a formal analysis along these lines.  Also, a similar issue arises in the selling case if we 
were to allow the monopolist in each period to repurchase and scrap used units (see Waldman (1997) and Fudenberg 
and Tirole (1998)).
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(see Mann (1992) for an analysis along these lines).  The third reason is that there are antitrust concerns 
that go back to the 1953 United Shoe Machinery Case that limit the ability of durable-goods producers 
with significant market power to employ policies that result in most units being rented.
As a final related point, one might argue that our approach is unrealistic since the type of 
contractual commitment that we assume is not typical among durable-goods producers with significant 
market power.  However, one interpretation of our analysis is that in the period following the merger the 
monopolist does not in fact commit to all future output levels, but rather after the merger the monopolist 
behaves as if it could commit because of the returns associated with establishing a reputation for not 
falling victim to the time-inconsistency problem.  As Ausubel and Deneckere (1989) show, a durable-
goods monopolist can sometimes partially or even fully avoid the time-inconsistency problem concerning 
output choice because of the incentives for reputation formation associated with repeated interaction.
B)  Monopoly Steady State and Transition  Dynamics
In the monopoly steady state, when the firm maximizes the present discounted value of profits 
today and in later periods it chooses the output sequence that maximizes per period profits.  As described 
in the previous section, in any period the prices of the various vintages are functions of the total stock of 
new and used units available.  We can use equations (5) through (10), which we will refer to as the 
pricing equations, to solve for the new-unit price as a function of steady-state output, y, and the model 
parameters, and then use that to derive per period profit as a function of the model parameters and in turn 
the optimal new-unit output.  To be precise, for a given choice of new-unit output level, the first step is to 
determine the associated scrappage age S along with the the proportion of such units consumed, ￿.  
Knowledge of the (S,￿) pair then determines the set of pricing equations for new and used goods.  Noting 
that the price of the age-S good is set to the scrap price in each period, we can then recursively solve 
pairs of pricing equations for the equilibrium price of each successively younger vintage until the entire 
steady-state price vector is established.  Given this, we can then substitute the expression for the new-unit 
price into the per period profit function, ￿=y[p0(y)-c], to yield per period profit as a function of new-unit 
output and the model parameters.  Finally, given the expression for per period profit as a function of new-
unit output, one can then optimize to solve for the monopoly steady state. 
We now turn our attention to the transition dynamics associated with merger to monopoly.  
Given any arbitrary sequence of new-unit outputs, it is possible to determine for each period the age of 
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the oldest unit consumed and the equilibrium prices.  The pricing equations tell us that the price of a unit 
of age s in period t is determined by its own price in period t+1, the prices of age-s-1 and age-s units in 
periods t and t+1, respectively, and the total mass of used units of age s or less in period t.  In turn, given 
the price of any given vintage good must equal the scrap price, z, in any period in which units of that 
vintage are scrapped, we can work recursively backwards from the price at the scrap date to solve for all 
the prices of a good over its lifetime.
To see the logic here in more detail, let us fix a sequence of new-unit outputs and focus on the 
sequence of prices for new units produced at some date t￿.  Further, let t￿+j be the last period in which 
units produced in period t￿ are consumed.  To keep things simple, assume that 0<￿t<1 for all t￿￿t￿t￿+j so 
that the price of the oldest unit consumed in each period t, t￿￿t￿t￿+j, equals the scrap price.  This 
assumption also guarantees that the oldest unit consumed in each of these periods is of age j, and that no 
units produced in period t￿ are scrapped prior to period t￿+j.  We can also easily determine the period t￿+j-
1 price of a new unit produced in period t￿.  Since in period t￿+j-1 some units produced in t￿-1 are 
scrapped and some are consumed, the period t￿+j-1 price for such a unit is just the scrap price.  Given 
this, equations (5) and (7) yield that the period t￿+j-1 price for a new unit produced in t￿ is given by (11).
(11)                               p(j-1,t￿+j-1)=z+b1+(1-￿ =
j




In turn, this last calculation can be performed for a new unit produced in every period t and in this way 
solve for every period’s prices for used units of age j and j-1.
Now consider period t￿+j-2.  The price of a used unit of age j equals the scrap price, while the 
price of a used unit of age j-1 is determined by equation (11) (after substituting t￿+j-2 for t￿+j-1).  Given 
this, the price in t￿+j-2 for a new unit produced in period t￿ is determined by equation (12), where in the 
equation the price of an age j-1 unit in period t￿+j-1 is also determined by equation (11).  










For a new unit produced in any period t, continually repeating this procedure allows us to solve for all the 
prices during the lifetime of the unit including the period-t￿ price.  In turn, given prices for new units 
produced in every period t, we can calculate the present discounted value of profits for any sequence of 
new-unit outputs.
Given we now have a way of computing profits for any sequence of new-unit outputs, the 
remaining issue is how to search for the optimal or profit-maximizing sequence over all possible 
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sequences of outputs.  There are a few important issues concerning this search.  First, if each period’s 
value for S(t) were known beforehand, then it might be possible to apply dynamic programming methods 
to derive a function that gives the monopolist’s choice of output in each period as a function of the stock 
of used units available at the time of the merger.  However, because any period’s value for S(t) is 
determined by the actual stock of units available for consumption in that period, dynamic programming 
approaches will not work since the structure of the problem is not known until a sequence of new-unit 
outputs has actually been specified.
Second, even though the monopolist is  solving an infinite -period problem, we are only interested 
in the first few periods following the merger.  To make the seach for an optimal sequence of new-unit 
outputs feasible, we treat the infinite-period problem as a finite-period problem by assuming that from 
period T>>0 onwards the monopolist’s output is fixed at the monopoly steady-state level.  Whether 
convergence to the steady state would have occurred by time T is immaterial for our analysis as long as T 
is sufficiently far in the future that outputs after period T have little influence on the firm’s decisions at 
the beginning of the output sequence.  In the analysis below, we set T=151.  In other words, the 
monopolist’s problem is to choose an output sequence for the first 150 periods following the merger such 
that the present discounted value of profits is maximized given the assumption that output is equal to the 
monopoly steady-state level starting in period T=151.10
The problem was programmed using MATLAB, and a constrained numerical gradient line seach 
optimization routine was used to solve for the optimal sequence of outputs from t=1 to T-1(=150).  In this 
routine numerical gradients are calculated that are then employed to determine search direction and step 
size during each iteration.  The specific search routine employed is consistent with the BFGS method 
which is a standard approach for doing numerical optimization searches.  Note that, in general, numerical 
optimization searches of this sort do not inherently guarantee convergence to a global optimum.  To 
increase confidence in the obtained solution, for each parameterization we considered several different 
vectors of starting values.  In all cases the solution obtained was independent of the starting values 
chosen.11
10 For a number of the parameterizations we explore, we have considered values for T above 151 and there were no 
noticeable changes in the results.
11 For further discussion see MATLAB documentation for the function “fmincon” and Appendix B of Judge et al. 
(1985). 
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IV. A NUMERICAL EXAMPLE
For the purposes of examining and illustrating the properties of our model, this section presents 
an analysis of a numerical example based on the market for large 4-wheel-drive agricultural tractors.  
This market has been the focus of several previous analyses of mergers in durable-goods markets 
characterized by active secondhand markets.  We first parameterize the model described in the previous 
section making reference to this real-world market and then investigate our hypothetical merger scenario.  
Employing this approach allows us to analyze the welfare effects due to a merger in our framework and 
compare the results to previous analyses that employ a Swan-type durability assumption.  Before 
proceeding, however, we emphasize again that the analysis in this section is meant to illustrate the 
properties of our model as opposed to being an effort to describe and predict actual outcomes in the 
tractor market.
A) Parameterization and Steady-State Results
New 4-wheel-drive agricultural tractors are currently priced between $100k and $150k.  
Assuming that the current situation is close to a competitive equilibrium, prices should be close to both a 
seller’s average total cost and marginal cost for the quality of tractor sold.  We thus assume for our 
analysis that each seller’s constant marginal cost of production equals $100k.  The parameters for the 
linear repair cost function are from Perry and Nixon (1991) who employ an equation in the Agricultural 
Engineers Yearbook (1986), where the equation gives annual tractor repair costs as a function of the 
new-unit price and cumulative hours of use.  Employing a new-unit price of $100k (which is the 
competitive price in our model given a marginal cost of $100k) and assuming a constant annual hours of 
usage (common across all consumers) of 800 hours per year, our repair cost function is given by m(s)=-
768+1536s.12  Note that this repair cost equation was parameterized using 1989 data, so it might 
somewhat underestimate current repair costs.  This, however, should not affect the qualitative nature of 
the results  
For the other parameters of the model, real-world evidence concerning the 4-wheel-drive tractor 
industry provides less guidance.  With this in mind, we allow the rate of quality deterioration, ￿, to vary 
and in particular we consider values between .5 and .95.  Similarly, we allow the quality of a new unit, 
12 Perry and Nixon (1991) use the repair cost equation in an analysis of optimal tractor replacement ages.  In their 
analysis they assume 400, 800, and 1200 annual hours of usage.
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N, to vary between 100k and 200k.  Finally, the remaining parameter which is the scrap price, z, is set 
equal to $100 (one percent of the new unit marginal cost) which, given a slow rate of depreciation and 
our assumptions for the other parameters, yields plausible values for the retirement age in the competitive 
steady state.
We now turn to steady-state results.  Table 1 compares the competitive and monopoly steady 
states for different values of the model parameters.  Not surprisingly, the table shows that the age of the 
oldest unit consumed is increasing in the rate of quality depreciation.  This simply says that used units 
will be retired later when there is an increase in the vector of qualities corresponding to used units of 
various ages.  Another straightforward result is that the age of the oldest unit consumed is at least as high 
under monopoly as under competition.  From earlier analyses, we know that the net valuation of the 
marginal consumer of the oldest unit consumed equals the scrap value z.  As the monopolist restricts 
output, the valuations of the consumers of units of any fixed age must rise.  Since a consumer’s net 
valuation for consuming a unit of fixed quality is positively related to the consumer’s valuation for 
quality, as the consumer valuations associated with any fixed vintage rise the age of the oldest unit 
consumed must (weakly) increase for the net valuation of the marginal consumer of the oldest unit 
consumed to be equal to the scrap value.
Another interesting set of results in Table 1 concerns how new-unit quality affects new-unit 
output and the age of the oldest unit consumed.  Consider first the competitive case.  In that case, if we 
hold the depreciation rate fixed, an increase in new-unit quality increases steady-state output but 
generally decreases the age of the oldest unit consumed.  The logic here is that in the competitive case 
the new-unit price is fixed, so it is not surprising that an increase in new-unit quality increases the steady-
state number of new units consumed.  In turn, for a fixed used-unit age, an increase in new-unit output 
decreases the valuations of the consumers of used units of that age.  The result is that, since the 
valuations of the consumers of any fixed aged unit decreases, the age of the oldest unit consumed falls in 
order for the net valuation of the marginal consumer of the oldest unit consumed to equal the scrap value.  
Now consider the monopoly case.  In contrast to the competitive case, if we hold the depreciation 
rate fixed, in the monopoly case an increase in new-unit quality has an ambiguous effect on steady-state 
output (sometimes it rises and sometimes it falls) while the age of the oldest unit consumed tends to rise.  
The logic here is as follows.  If new-unit quality rises, the monopolist typically increases its price so the 
overall effect on steady-state output is ambiguous.  In turn, we now have that, in contrast to the 
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competitive case, there is no systematic change in the valuations of the consumers of units of any fixed 
age.  Rather, what is important is that, as new-unit quality rises, there is a corresponding increase in the 
vector of used-unit qualities.  Hence, because of this, we now have that the age of the oldest unit 
consumed must rise for the net valuation of the marginal consumer of the oldest unit consumed to equal 
the scrap price.13
Table 2 presents the per period total surplus for both the competitive and monopoly steady states 
for various values of new-unit quality and the depreciation rate.  It also presents what we refer to as the 
percentage deadweight loss due to monopoly which is the difference between the competitive and 
monopoly steady state per period total surplus values divided by the competitive value for this number.  
As the table indicates, the percentage deadweight losses due to monopoly are substantial varying in our 
simulations between 22% and 34%.  One might also ask what are the factors that cause this percentage to 
be either higher or lower.  But a close look at the table indicates there is not a simple answer to this 
question.  In some cases increasing the depreciation rate increases the percentage deadweight loss, while 
in other cases there is a decrease.  Similarly, increasing new-unit quality sometimes increases but other 
times decreases the percentage deadweight loss.14
B)  Preliminary Discussion of the Post -Merger Dynamic Adjustment
We first describe output and price dynamics given a merger that results in monopoly followed by 
no subsequent entry.  For each of our parameterizations, there is a large drop in output in the very first 
period following the merger.  The output sequence for each parameterization then entails a decaying 
cyclical fluctuation that converges to the monopoly steady-state output.  Although the dynamic 
13 Given the above discussion, we can now more completely understand the competitive case.  In that case there are 
actually two countervailing effects.  First, as indicated, an increase in new-unit quality causes new-unit output to rise 
and thus the valuations of the consumers of units of any fixed age to decrease.  Second, holding used-unit age fixed, 
as in the monopoly case an increase in new-unit quality causes used-unit quality to increase.  The first effect suggests 
the age of the oldest unit consumed should fall, while the second suggests it should rise.  The table indicates that for 
our parameterizations the first effect typically dominates.
14 As shown in Gerstle (2003), the percentage deadweight loss due to monopoly is a function of the maximum age of 
a used unit consumed in the monopoly steady state.  What happens as, for example, new-unit quality increases, is that 
there are discrete positive jumps in this maximum age.  When new-unit quality increases but there is no change in 
this maximum age, then monopoly output increases and the percentage deadweight loss falls.  However, when there 
is a positive jump, monopoly output falls and there is a corresponding increase in the percentage deadweight loss.  
This nonmonotonic relationship is why there is no simple pattern to the percentage deadweight loss values in Table 
2.
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adjustment path is characterized by fluctuating output, new-unit prices follow a relatively monotonic 
convergence path to the steady-state values.  In particular, the new-unit price jumps immediately after the 
establishment of the monopoly, where among the parameterizations we consider the smallest price 
increase is 26% and the largest is 245%.  The new-unit price then increases monotonically until it 
approaches the steady-state value at which point the price path is characterized by dampening 
fluctuations around the steady-state value.15  In his 1989 analysis, Froeb emphasizes the time it takes 
after a merger for the monopolist to increase the new-unit price by at least 5% as an important statistic 
for the evaluation of competitive harm due to the merger.  Clearly that threshold is exceeded immediately 
in all of our parameterizations.
The primary goal of this paper is to evaluate the welfare effects of mergers in durable-goods 
industries.  When evaluating the welfare effects of mergers, regulators in the U.S. typically assume that 
the supranormal profits associated with a merger that substantially increases market power will attract 
entry after some finite number of periods and that this entry will eliminate some or all of the market 
power created by the merger.  With this in mind, we now assume that some fixed number of periods after 
the merger, entry occurs and returns the industry to a competitive situation.  In order to facilitate 
comparison with results in Carlton and Gertner (1989), we begin by assuming that this entry is 
unanticipated.  At the end of the analysis we consider how results change when the entry is anticipated.
In evaluating the welfare effects of a merger followed by entry a few periods later, there is one 
significant difference to keep in mind between the setting considered here and that considered by Carlton 
and Gertner.  Suppose, for example, that entry occurs five periods after the merger.  In Carlton and 
Gertner’s analysis, the social welfare-harm of the merger is limited to the five periods in which the 
monopoly is in existence.  The reason is that, since producers have a constant marginal cost of production
and Carlton and Gertner employ a Swan-type durability assumption, as soon as entry occurs both the 
price for a service unit and consumption levels immediately revert to their competitive steady-state 
values.  Hence, a merger that results in a short-lived monopoly causes social-welfare losses in the periods 
in which the monopoly is in existence, but there are no losses once entry occurs.
Now consider what happens in our model when a merger is followed by entry five periods later.  
In our model the welfare losses are not confined to the five periods of monopoly.  As opposed to the 
15 See Gerstle (2003) for a detailed depiction of the price and output adjustment paths.
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Carlton and Gertner analysis, in this model consumption decisions are not solely a function of the new-
unit price but also depend on the quantities and ages of used units available at the beginning of a period.  
To be precise, holding fixed the price for a new unit at its competitive steady-state value, decreasing the 
numbers of used units of various ages below their steady-state levels will cause some, maybe many, 
individuals to consume units of lower quality than is the case in the competitive steady state.  Hence, 
when the monopolist decreases new-unit output it not only decreases welfare in the periods in which the 
output decreases take place, but also decreases welfare later because of the effects on the subsequent 
stocks of used units available for consumption.
As a final preliminary point, the analysis that follows focuses on a comparison of welfare losses 
from merger in our durable-goods model with the welfare losses from the same merger scenario in a 
nondurable-goods setting.  For each parameterization, we calculate what we refer to as the deadweight-
loss ratio (DWL ratio).  In this calculation the numerator is the sum of discounted within period 
deadweight losses beginning with the first post-merger period and extending through reconvergence to 
the competitive steady state.  The denominator is the sum of discounted within period deadweight losses 
from monopoly in a nondurable-goods setting.  The sum in the denominator is taken over the periods 
between the merger and subsequent entry since for a nondurable good the market reverts immediately to 
the competitive steady state upon entry. 
In calculating our deadweight-loss ratios, the obvious question is what is the best choice of a 
nondurable-goods model to serve as our nondurable-good analogue.  Our approach is to use our model 
under the assumption that the depreciation factor, ￿, equals zero, i.e., the good fully depreciates after a 
single period.  This is equivalent to assuming a nondurable product characterized by a linear downward 
sloping demand curve in each period and a constant marginal cost of production.  We calibrate this 
demand curve so that for each parameterization the total surplus in the competitive steady state of our 
nondurable-good analogue is equal to the total surplus in the competitive steady state of our durable-
goods model.  Given our nondurable-good analogue is characterized by a linear downward sloping 
demand curve and a constant marginal cost of production, the per period deadweight loss due to 
monopoly in this nondurable analogue equals 25% of the total surplus under perfect competition.
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C)  A Comparison of Deadweight Loss Ratios
We begin by considering parameterizations for which entry takes place relatively quickly after 
the merger, i.e., five periods after the merger.  These are the parameterizations for which deadweight 
losses due to merger are smallest and thus the ones that pose the strongest case for the position that 
durable-goods mergers create little social-welfare harm.  Later we consider how results change when the 
number of periods after which entry occurs is allowed to vary.  Table 3 reports deadweight-loss ratios for 
these parameterizations, and for comparison also provides deadweight loss ratios for the same 
parameterizations for the Carlton and Gertner model.16  Before discussing the results, there are two 
things to note about the Carlton and Gertner values.  First, in contrast to our model, in the Carlton and 
Gertner model the deadweight-loss ratio is independent of new-unit quality.  Second, whereas in our 
model the depreciation rate refers to the speed of quality decay, in the Carlton and Gertner model the 
depreciation rate refers to the speed of physical decay of service units under Swan-type durability.
There are two main findings captured in Table 3.  The first is that varying the depreciation rate 
has similar qualitative effects on the deadweight-loss ratios in our analysis and Carlton and Gertner’s.  In 
each case, as the depreciation rate rises, the deadweight-loss ratio rises, i.e., the deadweight loss due to 
the merger in the durable-goods case moves closer to the deadweight loss in the nondurable-good 
analogue.  Further, in both cases the basic logic behind the result is the same.  As the depreciation rate 
rises, the inherited stock of used units at the time of the merger becomes smaller or less significant (fewer 
service units in the Carlton and Gertner model and used units of lower quality in our model).  In turn, this 
means that with faster depreciation the monopolist is less constrained in terms of exercising its market 
power with the result being that deadweight losses due to monopoly behavior rise. 
The second main finding captured in Table 3 which is the main result of the paper is that 
deadweight-loss ratios are consistently higher in our model than in Carlton and Gertner’s, where for 
many of the parameterizations the difference is striking.  For example, if we focus on slow rates of 
depreciation, i.e., ￿ equals .9 and .95, the deadweight-loss ratio in our analysis varies between 3.3 and 6.7 
times the deadweight-loss ratio in the Carlton and Gertner analysis.  For faster depreciation, i.e., ￿ equals 
16 These values are taken from Carlton and Gertner (1989, pp. S204-S208).  Note that Carlton and Gertner calculate 
deadweight loss-ratios given entry occurs both five and one hundred periods after the merger.  Also, although 
Carlton and Gertner use a monopoly renter of nondurable services as their nondurable analogue in their calculation 
of deadweight-loss ratios, their calculations would be unchanged by assuming the same nondurable-good analogue 
that we employ.
http://law.bepress.com/alea/14th/art3123
.5 and .8, the deadweight-loss ratios in our analysis are proportionately closer to the deadweight loss 
ratios in their analysis, but to a great extent this is because with faster depreciation the deadweight loss 
ratios in their analysis are higher and this bounds how many times higher our ratio can be than theirs (this 
assumes the deadweight loss ratio never exceeds one or never exceeds one by very much).  Or to put this 
another way, for the parameterizations in which the Carlton and Gertner analysis most strongly suggests 
that durable-goods mergers create small social-welfare losses, i.e., fast entry and slow depreciation, our 
analysis shows deadweight losses due to merger significantly higher than in their analysis.
As discussed briefly in the Introduction, this difference in deadweight-loss ratios is due to the 
different ways that durability is modeled across the two analyses.  Carlton and Gertner assume Swan-type 
durability which means that a good is essentially a bundle of service units and multiple used units can be 
combined to create a perfect substitute for a new unit.  As a result, when a merger occurs and the 
monopolist reduces output, higher-valuation individuals continue to purchase new units or combine used 
units to form a perfect substitute for a new unit.  Hence, the only individuals whose consumptions levels 
are affected by the merger are those who received little surplus from consumption in the competitive 
steady state in the first place, which in turn means that at least initially there is little social-welfare loss 
due to the monopolist exercising its market power after the merger.
We illustrate this argument in Figure 1.  Consider the parameterization in which the depreciation 
rate equals .95 and new-unit quality equals 200k.  Figure 1 shows the deadweight loss in the first post-
merger period given this parameterization of the Carlton and Gertner model and the assumption the 
monopolist produces zero output.  As pictured, even if the monopolist produces zero the social-welfare 
loss is quite small.  The reason is that, given depreciation is slow, the aggregate number of service units 
contained in the existing stock of used units is close to the steady-state level.  Hence, consistent with the 
above discussion, any consumer who receives significant surplus in the competitive steady state is 
unaffected in terms of consumption by the monopolist producing zero and so the aggregate social-welfare 
loss must be small.
Now consider our model.  In our model an individual can only consume one physical unit at a 
time which means that a number of used units cannot be combined to create a perfect substitute for a new 
unit.  The implication of this assumption is that, after a merger occurs and the resulting monopolist 
reduces its output, it is not just the consumers who receive little surplus in the competitive steady state 
whose consumption levels are affected.  Rather, many consumers including those who receive substantial 
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levels of surplus in the competitive steady state wind up consuming lower quality units than under 
competition.  The end result is that the deadweight losses due to merger and monopoly in our analysis are 
substantially larger than in the Carlton and Gertner analysis.
We illustrate this argument in Figure 2.  As before, consider the parameterization in which the 
depreciation rate equals .95 and new-unit quality equals 200k.  Figure 2 shows the deadweight loss in the 
first post-merger period given this parameterization of our model and the assumption the monopolist 
produces zero output.  In contrast to what was true in Figure 1, we see in Figure 2 that the social-welfare 
loss is substantial, where the logic for this result follows from the above discussion.  Even with slow 
depreciation, when the monopolist produces zero all the consumers are forced to consume lower quality 
units than is the case in the competitive steady state.  In turn, since some of these consumers receive 
significant surplus in the competitive steady state, the reduction in quality across the board has a 
significant effect on social welfare.
In Table 3 we considered deadweight-loss ratios given entry occurs five periods after the merger.  
In Table 4 we extend the analysis by allowing the number of periods between merger and entry to vary.  
There are three main results captured by the table.  First, consistent with what was found in Table 3, as 
the depreciation rate falls the deadweight loss rises.  As before, this simply captures the idea that, as 
depreciation slows, the existing stock of used units at the time of the merger serves as less of a constraint 
on the monopolist’s exercise of market power.  Second, also consistent with what was found in Table 3, 
for most parameterizations the deadweight loss ratio is higher for our model than for Carlton and 
Gertner’s and this difference is substantial whenever the deadweight loss ratio for the Carlton and 
Gertner model is small (below, for example, forty percent).  Also as before, this difference is driven by 
the different ways that durability is modeled across the two analyses.
The third and final result captured in Table 4 is that, holding the depreciation rate and the value 
for new-unit quality fixed, the deadweight-loss ratio rises with the number of periods between merger 
and subsequent entry.  For example, given a depreciation rate of .95 and new-unit quality equal to 150k, 
the deadweight-loss ratio equals 16%, 36%, 50%, and 81% when the number of periods between merger 
and entry is five, ten, fifteen, and one hundred, respectively.  Also of interest is that, as the number of 
periods grows large, the deadweight-loss ratio sometimes exceeds 100%, i.e., the deadweight loss for our 
durable-goods model sometimes exceeds the deadweight loss for the nondurable-goods analogue.  The 
basic logic for these findings is that, as we move forward in time away from the merger, the stock of used 
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units at the time of the merger serves less and less as a constraint on the monopolist’s exercise of market 
power.  This means the deadweight loss associated with the merger is higher in later periods, which, in 
turn, means that the deadweight-loss ratio rises with the number of periods between merger and entry.
Our final exercise is to consider how results change when entry is anticipated rather than 
unanticipated.  Following Carlton and Gertner’s analysis, in our earlier results we assumed that the entry 
was unanticipated, i.e., at the time of the merger and up through the period prior to entry both the 
monopolist and all the consumers assumed that there would be no subsequent entry and that the 
monopoly would stay in place indefinitely.  In Table 5 we focus on parameterizations in which entry 
occurs five periods after the merger and investigate how results change when entry is anticipated, i.e., at 
the time of the merger it is understood by both the monopolist and all the consumers that entry resulting 
in competition will occur five periods after the merger.17
Table 5 clearly tells us that allowing entry to be anticipated increases the deadweight-loss ratio, 
i.e., the social-welfare losses due to durable-goods mergers are larger and closer to losses in our 
nondurable-goods analogue when entry is anticipated.18  Further, these increases are frequently 
substantial, but not always so.  For example, given a depreciation rate of .95 and new-unit quality equal 
to 100k, the deadweight loss ratio with anticipated entry is more than double the deadweight loss ratio 
with unanticipated entry - 32.0% versus 13.7%.  On the other hand, the increase is small - 17.8% versus 
16.4% - when the depreciation rate equals .95 and new-unit quality equals 150k.
The basic logic for the above finding is that when consumers anticipate entry they react in a way 
that aggravates the social-welfare losses due to the merger.  The consumers know that when entry occurs 
the price for a new unit will fall to the competitive level.  As a result, in the periods leading up to the 
entry consumers reduce their purchases of new units because they realize they can significantly lower the 
price they have to pay by delaying their purchases.  In turn, this reduction in new-unit purchases lowers 
social welfare in two ways.  First, it lowers social welfare in the periods leading up to the entry because 
17 Although in Table 5 we focus on parameterizations in which entry occurs five periods after the merger, we have 
also considered parameterizations in which entry occurs later and qualitatively the results are the same.
18 In the nondurable-goods analogue, assuming entry is anticipated rather than unanticipated has no effect on 
behavior and thus no effect on the social-welfare losses due to merger.  Hence, the larger values in Table 5 in the 
anticipated case are due solely to increased social-welfare losses in our durable-goods model.  It is also of interest to 
note that in the Carlton and Gertner analysis, because after the merger the monopolist rents rather than sells and 
because the firm has a zero marginal cost of production, allowing entry to be anticipated has no effect on the results.
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the reduced consumption of new units means many individuals consume lower quality units than they do 
under unanticipated entry.  Second, it lowers social welfare in the periods just following the entry 
because those periods are characterized by smaller stocks of used units and this also causes many 
individuals to consume lower quality units than they do under unanticipated entry.
V. CONCLUSION
Consider a durable-goods merger that transforms a competitive situation to one characterized by 
significant market power.  Immediately after the merger the presence of the competitively supplied stock 
of used units limits the post-merger producers from exercising their market power.  In a classic paper, 
Carlton and Gertner (1989) explored this argument in a setting where a durable-goods merger transforms 
a competitive situation into one characterized by monopoly, with entry transforming the industry back to 
a competitive outcome relatively quickly after the merger.  Carlton and Gertner show that, if the durable 
product depreciates relatively slowly, then the constraints posed by the existing stock of used units 
severely limits both the post-merger exercise of market power and the social-welfare losses due to the 
merger.  Specifically, assuming entry occurs five periods after the merger, they find social-welfare losses 
due to a durable-goods merger to be less than 10% of the welfare losses due to an analogous nondurable-
goods merger.
In this paper we have investigated the robustness of Carlton and Gertner’s findings to a different 
specification for how durability is modeled.  Their analysis employed an approach to modeling durable-
goods markets that was popularized by Swan in the early 1970s.  In this approach new and used “service 
units” are perfect substitutes in consumption or, in other words, a consumer is indifferent between a new 
unit and some number of used units that provide the same number of service units.  Recent papers by 
Waldman (1996) and Hendel and Lizzeri (1999) have criticized this approach as being unrealistic and 
investigated an alternative approach in which in each period an individual consumes either zero or one 
physical unit and durability captures the speed with which the quality of a unit deteriorates.
In this paper we have explored the social-welfare consequences of durable-goods mergers in a 
setting consistent with this more recent literature.  Our first main result is that Carlton and Gertner are 
correct that an existing competitive stock of used units will typically result in a reduction in the social-
welfare losses due to a merger that significantly increases market power.  However, we also find that this 
reduction is much smaller when durability is more realistically modeled as speed of quality deterioration 
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rather than speed of decay of service units.  For example, assuming entry after five periods and 
depreciation rates of .95 and .9, Carlton and Gertner in their analysis of the 4-wheel drive agricultural 
tractor industry find that a durable-goods merger that transforms the industry from competition to 
monopoly results in social-welfare losses equal to 2% and 8%, respectively, of the analogous nondurable-
goods merger.  In contrast, focusing on the estimates based on an intermediate value for the value of a 
new unit, our similar analysis yields social-welfare losses in the durable-goods case equal to 16% and 
33% of the analogous nondurable-goods merger.
Our other main results concern factors that affect the difference between the social-welfare 
losses in the durable-goods and nondurable-goods cases.  First, not surprisingly and consistent with 
Carlton and Gertner’s analysis, we find that the durable-goods social-welfare loss due to merger gets 
closer to the analogous nondurable-goods social-welfare loss as the number of periods before entry 
occurs grows.  What is different in our analysis, however, is that as the number of periods grows large 
the durable-goods loss sometimes even exceeds the analogous nondurable-goods loss, where this occurs 
because output reductions in our durable-goods model affects consumers across the valuation spectrum 
as opposed to merely affecting low-valuation types as in the nondurable-goods analogue.  Second, in our 
main analysis we focus on unanticipated entry in order to facilitate comparison with the Carlton and 
Gertner analysis which also focuses on this case.  We find, however, that similar to what was true when 
we increased the number of periods until entry occurs, allowing entry to be anticipated rather than 
unanticipated causes the durable-goods social-welfare loss to increase and thus get closer to the 
analogous nondurable-goods social-welfare loss.
We believe the ramifications of our analysis are clear.  Consistent with Carlton and Gertner’s 
analysis, if depreciation is slow and entry is likely to be relatively quick, then the antitrust authorities 
need to be less concerned about the anticompetitive effects of mergers in durable-goods industries than 
they are for analogous nondurable-goods industries.  We depart from Carlton and Gertner, however, in 
terms of the extent of this reduced scrutiny.  Whereas their analysis suggests a much reduced level of 
scrutiny for durable-goods industries, our analysis suggests that the degree of latitude afforded mergers in 
these industries needs to be carefully evaluated on a case-by-case basis as the bounds on welfare harm 
are not nearly as constraining as a reading of Carlton and Gertner might indicate.
There are a number of directions in which the analysis in this paper could be extended, where 
there are two that we feel are of particular interest.  First, it would be interesting to look at different pre-
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and post-merger market structures.  Following previous literature on the consequences of durable-goods 
mergers, we assumed an industry that was competitive prior to the merger and monopolistic after the 
merger (and again competitive after the subsequent entry).  But clearly in many if not most real-world 
settings both pre- and post-merger market structures are likely to be oligopolistic, where a merger 
increases market power but rarely results in monopoly.  It would thus be of interest to extend our analysis 
to oligopolistic interaction both before and after the merger.  Second, again following previous literature, 
in this paper we explored the consequences of a merger in a durable-goods industry in order to gain 
insight about optimal antitrust enforcement for such industries.  We do not, however, directly consider 
the social-welfare implications of different levels of antitrust enforcement.  We thus feel that it would be 




Table 1.  Comparison of competitive and monopoly steady states
Competitive Monopoly







S New unit 
output
S Ratio of Monopoly to 
Competitive output
0.95 100 0.10493 7 0.03455 15 32.9%
150 0.12918 6 0.03501 17 27.1%
200 0.13879 6 0.03278 19 23.6%
0.90 100 0.12415 6 0.04404 10 35.5%
150 0.15302 5 0.04849 12 31.7%
200 0.18507 5 0.04780 13 25.8%
0.80 100 0.15906 4 0.07451 7 46.8%
150 0.20193 4 0.06829 7 33.8%
200 0.23683 3 0.08190 8 34.6%
0.50 100 0.17416 3 0.08667 3 49.8%
150 0.28389 2 0.12626 3 44.5%
200 0.34926 2 0.14606 3 41.8%
Discount rate = 0.95.
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Table 2.  Total surplus comparisons
Rate of quality 
depreciation
Q
N ('000s) Competitive steady state Monopoly steady state % Deadweight Loss
0.95 100 28,721.81 20,095.29 30.0%
150 50,880.07 35,204.66 30.8%
200 73,468.89 48,894.93 33.4%
0.90 100 24,376.27 16,563.66 32.1%
150 45,230.77 30,833.24 31.8%
200 66,889.94 44,038.39 34.2%
0.80 100 18,344.18 14,265.50 22.2%
150 37,375.62 24,942.87 33.3%
200 57,802.71 40,914.34 29.2%
0.50 100 7,328.91 5,400.61 26.3%
150 23,094.99 16,705.52 27.7%
200 41,336.33 29,548.18 28.5%
Discount rate = 0.95.
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Table 3.  Deadweight Loss Ratios -- entry takes 5 periods
Depreciation rate Q
N ('000s) DWL ratio DWL ratio (CG model)
0.95 100 13.7% 2.2%
150 16.4% “
200 14.9% “
0.9 100 25.6% 7.7%
150 33.0% “
200 29.5% “
0.8 100 38.7% 23.2%
150 47.1% “
200 52.6% “
0.5 100 70.9% 66.2%
150 82.4% “
200 88.0% “
Discount factor = 0.95
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Table 4.  Comparative statics – time until entry
Q
N ('000s) Depreciation rate 5 periods 10 periods 15 periods 100 periods
100 0.95 14% 32% 50% 77%
0.90 26% 52% 69% 90%
0.80 39% 56% 61% 71%
0.50 71% 81% 84% 88%
150 0.95 16% 36% 50% 81%
0.90 33% 60% 75% 96%
0.80 47% 77% 89% 106%
0.50 82% 92% 96% 100%
200 0.95 15% 33% 47% 77%
0.90 29% 58% 76% 101%
0.80 53% 78% 86% 98%
0.50 88% 98% 101% 106%
CG model 0.95 2% 6% 11% 35%
0.90 8% 18% 28% 57%
0.80 23% 43% 54% 76%
0.50 66% 81% 85% 92%
Discount factor = 0.95
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Table 5.  Deadweight loss ratios, anticipated vs. unanticipated entry, entry takes 5 periods
Depreciation rate Q
N ('000s) Unanticipated Anticipated
0.95 100 13.7% 32.0%
150 16.4% 17.8%
200 14.9% 22.0%
0.9 100 25.6% 42.3%
150 33.0% 37.9%
200 29.5% 46.5%
0.8 100 38.7% 70.4%
150 47.1% 69.4%
200 52.6% 71.8%
0.5 100 70.9% 93.9%
150 82.4% 97.9%
200 88.0% 104.8%
Discount factor = 0.95
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Figure 1.  Social welfare loss with Swan-type durability
















Service units are redistributed to the highest 
valuation consumers.  Social welfare loss is 
associated with the lowest valuation individuals 
who no longer consume the good.
Figure 2.  Social welfare loss with quality depreciation:  
























n Shaded areas represent within period social welfare loss.  
Inability to combine used units or otherwise reallocate 
utility across units results in welfare losses distributed 
across the entire range of consumer valuations.
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